ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ Европейского суда по правам человека от 22.09.2005<ДЕЛО СОКОЛОВ (sokolov) ПРОТИВ РОССИИ> [англ.]
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF SOKOLOV v.
RUSSIA
(Application No. 3734/02)
JUDGMENT <*>
(Strasbourg,
22.IX.2005)
--------------------------------
<*> This judgment
will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sokolov
v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mrs F.
Tulkens,
Mrs S. Botoucharova,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mr K.
Hajiyev,
Mr D. Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens, judges,
and Mr S.
Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 August
2005,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (No. 3734/02)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention") by a Russian national, Mr Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sokolov ("the
applicant"), on 25 December 2001.
2. The Russian Government ("the
Government") were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Laptev, Representative of
the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. On 5
January 2004 the Court decided to communicate the application. Applying Article
29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of
the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
The circumstances of the
case
4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Moscow.
1. Labour
dispute
5. In July 1996 the applicant sued his former employer, a private
company, for wage arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
6.
On 31 January and 4 December 1997 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow
issued judgments in the applicant"s action which were subsequently quashed on
appeal.
7. The applicant amended his claims seeking reinstatement because
he had been meanwhile dismissed.
8. Between 13 July 1998 and 18 May 1999
the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow listed thirteen hearings, of which the
hearing on 13 July 1998 was adjourned due to the applicant"s absence and eight
hearings were adjourned so as to give time to his former employer to produce
additional evidence or to read materials submitted by the applicant. The
hearings of 3 and 18 March 1999 were adjourned due to the employer"s
absence.
9. On 8 June 1999 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow
allowed the applicant"s claim in part.
10. On an unspecified date the
applicant complained about the bailiffs" failure to enforce the judgment of 8
June 1999. On 17 November 1999 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow
confirmed that the bailiffs had failed to comply with the domestic time-limit
for the enforcement of judgments.
11. On 26 November 1999 the Moscow City
Court upheld the judgment of 8 June 1999. The judgments remained
unenforced.
12. On 14 December 2000 the Presidium of the Moscow City
Court quashed the judgments of 8 June and 26 November 1999 and remitted the case
to a differently composed bench.
13. On 23 January 2001 the President of
the Nikulinskiy District Court assigned the case to a judge.
14. Of
nineteen hearings scheduled between 7 February 2001 and 19 December 2002 two
hearings were adjourned on the applicant"s request. Six hearings were adjourned
due to the defendant"s failure to attend and five hearings were postponed as to
give the defendant time to submit additional evidence. Three hearings were
adjourned because the presiding judge was on leave or was involved in other
proceedings.
15. On 22 January 2003 the Nikulinskiy District Court of
Moscow reinstated the applicant, awarded him the arrears and a partial
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
16. On 28 July 2003 the Moscow
City Court upheld the judgment.
2. Enforcement proceedings
17. On 6
March 2003 bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings.
18. On 15 April
2003 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow, upon the bailiff"s request,
stayed the enforcement proceedings pending clarification of the judgment of 22
January 2003.
19. The applicant complained to a court that the judgment
of 22 January 2003, as upheld on 28 July 2003, had not been enforced. On 13
August 2003 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the complaint
holding that the enforcement proceedings had been lawfully stayed.
20. On
4 September 2003 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow clarified the judgment
of 22 January 2003, as upheld on 28 July 2003, and held that the applicant had
to be immediately reinstated in his previous position. The court resumed the
enforcement proceedings.
21. On 9 February 2004 the employer issued an
order reinstating the applicant in his previous position. On 17 February 2004
the applicant asked the employer to grant him annual leave for all years of
absence since 1996 and to dismiss him after the leave.
22. On 19 February
2004 the bailiffs asked the court to stay the enforcement until the applicant
would return from his leave.
23. On 14 April 2004 the Nikulinskiy
District Court of Moscow stayed the proceedings until the end of the applicant"s
leave. The applicant appealed against that decision on 7 June 2004.
24.
On 15 June 2004 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow disallowed the appeal
because the applicant had missed the time-limit for lodging it.
THE
LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention
concerning the length of the proceedings
25. The applicant complained that
the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the "reasonable time"
requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations...
everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]...
tribunal..."
A. Admissibility
26. The Government submitted that the
applicant was no longer a victim as the domestic courts had granted his
claim.
27. The applicant contested the Government"s view.
28.
However, even assuming that the partial granting of the applicant"s claim may be
regarded as a favourable outcome of the proceedings, the Court notes that such
an outcome was not directly connected with the length of the proceedings and
cannot therefore be considered, either directly or by implication, as a
recognition of a violation of Article 6 or as reparation for the damage
allegedly caused to the applicant by the length of the proceedings (see, mutatis
mutandis, Byrn v. Denmark, No. 13156/87, Commission decision of 1 July 1992,
Decisions and Reports (DR) 74, p. 5). Accordingly, the Government"s objection
should be dismissed.
29. The Court notes that the complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The period to be taken
into consideration
30. The Government submitted that the proceedings had
begun in July 1996 and ended on 28 July 2003 with the final judgment of the
Moscow City Court.
31. The applicant submitted that none of the judgments
in his case, including the one of 28 July 2003, had been enforced. In his view,
the duration of the enforcement should be included in the overall length.
32. The Court is of the view that the period between July 1996 and 9 February
2004 should be regarded as a whole because it was incumbent on the State to
enforce the judgment once it was issued. Therefore the periods when the
enforcement proceedings were pending must be regarded as an integral part of the
"trial" for the purpose of Article 6 and should be included in the overall
length (see Kravchuk v. Russia (dec.), No. 72749/01, 1 February 2005; Ivanova v.
Russia (dec.), No. 74705/02, 1 April 2004). The Court considers that the
proceedings lasted from July 1996 to 9 February 2004 when the employer issued
the order reinstating the applicant in his position.
33. The proceedings
therefore lasted more than seven years and seven months. The Court observes that
the period to be taken into consideration began on 5 May 1998, when the
Convention came into force in respect of Russia. Thus, in this case, at least
five years and nine months fall within the Court"s competence ratione
temporis.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
34. The
Government submitted that the delays in the adjudication of the applicant"s
action had been caused by the applicant"s systematic failure to attend the
hearings. Twenty-three hearings were adjourned because of his absence.
Furthermore, the applicant amended his claims on several occasions. For that
reason thirteen hearings were adjourned to give the defendant time to produce
new evidence.
35. The applicant averred that he had attended all
hearings, save for one on 13 July 1998 because he had not been summoned for it.
He pointed out that the Government did not indicate any particular hearing that
he had allegedly failed to attend, except that on 13 July 1998. He could not be
blamed for amending his claims because he had been forced to do so due to his
dismissal and a change in the employer"s legal status.
36. The Court
reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed
in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the
following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and
the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute
(see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
37. The Court considers that the case was not
particularly difficult to determine. Consequently, it takes the view that an
overall period of over seven years could not, in itself, be deemed to satisfy
the "reasonable time" requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
38. The Court notes that the parties disagreed on certain factual matters
concerning the applicant"s attendance of the hearings. As it appears from the
list of hearings included in the Government"s memorandum the applicant was
present at all hearings, save for one on 13 July 1998. The Government did not
indicate any other hearing which the applicant had failed to attend. Therefore
the Court finds it established that the applicant had only been absent on 13
July 1998. Irrespective of the reasons for his absence, the delay incurred
therefrom was negligible. As to the Government"s argument that the applicant
contributed to the delay in the proceedings by amending his claims, the Court
reiterates that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the
resources afforded by national law in the defence of his interest (see, mutatis
mutandis, {Yagci} <*> and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995,
Series A No. 319-A, § 66).
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на
национальном языке набраны латинским
шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
39.
The Court observes, however, that substantial periods of inactivity, for which
the Government have not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable
to the domestic authorities. For more than a year, from 26 November 1999 to 14
December 2000, the enforcement proceedings languished with no apparent progress.
The domestic courts admitted that the bailiffs had been responsible for their
failure to enforce the judgment. The aggregated length of the delays occasioned
by the judge"s absence and his participation in unrelated proceedings amounted
to approximately seven months. The Court also finds it peculiar that in the case
which was of no particular complexity so many hearings had to be adjourned to
give time to the defendant to produce additional evidence (compare with Di Pede
v. Italy, judgment of 26 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996-IV).
40. The Court furthermore notes that the conduct of the
defendant was one of the reasons for the prolongation of the proceedings. In the
Court"s opinion, the domestic authorities failed to take adequate steps in order
to ensure the defendant"s attendance. The defendant defaulted on at least eight
occasions which resulted in a delay of approximately seven months. There is no
indication that the court reacted in any way to that behaviour. Accordingly, the
Court considers that, the domestic courts did not avail themselves of the
measures available to it under national law to discipline the participants to
the proceedings and to ensure that the case be heard within a reasonable time
(see, mutatis mutandis, {Kusmierek} v. Poland, No. 10675/02, § 65, 21 September
2004).
41. Finally, the Court recalls that employment disputes generally
require particular diligence on the part of the domestic courts (Ruotolo v.
Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A No. 230-D, p. 39, § 17). Having
regard to the overall length of the proceedings, the Court concludes that the
applicant"s case was not examined within a reasonable time. There has
accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II.
Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
42. The applicant further
complained that in Russia there was no authority to which application could be
made to complain of the excessive length of proceedings. This complaint falls to
be examined under Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
43. The Government submitted that on several
occasions the applicant had successfully challenged the judgments before
higher-instance courts.
A. Admissibility
44. The Court notes that this
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
45. The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a
national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1
to hear a case within a reasonable time (see {Kudla} v. Poland [GC], No.
30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). It notes that the Government did not indicate
any remedy that could have expedited the determination of the applicant"s case
or provided him with adequate redress for delays that had already occurred (see
Kormacheva
